Operation Golden Bird & India's Neurotic Relationship With Myanmar
There’s a story going round that Myanmar is turning all sweet and democratic. The signs of a new dawn include such marvels as journalists being allowed to ask people questions, and opposition leaders being permitted to travel around the country, a bit.
For a nation that spends a lot of time hanging around with North Korea at the bottom of almost all freedom and human rights rankings, these marginal efforts towards democracy are both welcome and surprising.
They are particularly welcome in India, a country which has embarrassed itself over the past decade or more by its apparent blindness to the repressive nastiness carrying on next door, and which offered another red-carpet welcome when President Thein Sein visited New Delhi this week.
For this blackening of India’s reputation, it is not quite clear what it receives in return. One of the frequent arguments is that Myanmar is a vital partner in tackling insurgents from India’s northeast, who frequently pop across the 1,643-kilometre border to evade capture and restock their arsenals.
This is not the case. Unlike Bangladesh, which has handed over several key insurgent leaders to India since relations have improved, Myanmar has never done anything of any practical use to help India’s security agencies. Arms and drug smuggling routes remain in robust health in Myanmar’s border regions, providing ample money and supplies to all manner of insurgent organisations across India.
Myanmar has come close to being helpful on a couple of occasions. In November 2001, its army raided four Manipuri rebel bases, arresting 192 insurgents including UNLF chief Rajkumar Meghen. But then it let them all go.
The other incident, which seems to have had a powerful psychological effect on the Indian establishment, was Operation Golden Bird in 1995.
Golden Bird began as an unprecedented moment of co-operation between the armies of Myanmar and India. The 57 Indian Mountain Division had tracked a column of 200 insurgents from various groups – the NSCN, ULFA and Manipuri rebels – who had picked up a huge shipment of arms south of Cox’s Bazar on the Bangladesh coast and was moving along the Myanmar border towards Manipur. Between them, the troops from India and Myanmar soon had the rebels trapped in a pincer movement.
It was at just that moment that the government in New Delhi, which was then a vocal supporter of the opposition in Myanmar, gave Aung San Suu Kyi the Nehru Award for International Understanding. The military junta in Myanmar were not impressed, and pulled out of the operation, allowing the rebels to escape.
An angry Indian eastern army commander, Lieutenant General H.R.S. Kalkat later remarked: “India should leave its Burma policy to the army. We are soldiers, they (the junta) are soldiers and our blood is thicker than the blood of bureaucrats.” It is a message that seems to have reached the corridors of power in New Delhi, even if the change in diplomatic tactics has achieved little.
For all the claims that India is engaging in a hard-nosed realpolitik regarding Myanmar, the fawning acceptance of its neighbour’s crimes seems to stem more from the neuroses created by these frequent let-downs than any positive conviction about the best way to engage a rogue regime.
India’s defenders say it has bought advantages in other areas, particularly in trade and energy supplies. India’s hunger for oil and natural gas certainly seems to be a major part of the motivation, as reflected in the deals struck this week to boost hydrocarbon exploration and speed up construction of a gas pipeline, alongside the $500 credit line offered by India to help with infrastructure projects.
Perhaps this time, India's efforts will bear fruit. They haven't in the past. Time and again, it is Chinese companies that have gained the most lucrative energy contracts, such as the 2007 decision to cancel the Gas Authority of India (GAIL)'s contract for two major gas blocks off the Rakine coast and give them to PetroChina.
As with everything India does in the region, this all comes down to a race with China, which has been a valuable diplomatic ally – and provider of military hardware – to Myanmar ever since the two countries made themselves international pariahs by brutally crushing popular protests in the late 1980s (the military coup in Burma in 1988 and Tiananmen Square in 1989). China has established such extensive trading networks and influence in the border regions that Mandalay is now referred to as a Chinese city due to the number of traders that hail from across the border.
But India may have been wrong to think that blindly accepting Myanmar’s horrendous human rights record was the only way to match Chinese influence - and not just because it has brought very few benefits for trade and security.
In many ways, India is a much more natural bed-fellow for Buddhist-oriented Myanmar than the atheistic regime in Beijing. “Myanmar’s elite hold deep-seated racist views about the Chinese,” Benedict Rogers, author of a biography about former military dictator Than Shwe, told me this week.
Suspicions run deep between China and Burma, not least because Beijing spent several decades in the mid-twentieth century supporting a Communist insurgency in Burma. For all the trade deals between Beijing and Naypyidaw, it was still only India that was allowed to provide aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.
While the recent decision to suspend construction at a Chinese-backed hydroelectric dam on the Irrawaddy River was partly a nod to public outrage (a rarity indeed), it should also be seen in the light of these concerns about Chinese influence and cultural differences.
Benedict Rogers also denies the idea that tougher approaches to the junta's behaviour, such as sanctions imposed by the US and EU, have been a failure. “The junta complains about them all the time, so they must be having some impact,” he said. “They are desperate to reach out to the West because they know their current situation is unsustainable.”
Whatever successes India may achieve with regard to Myanmar in the coming years will not have been thanks to its policy of appeasement - the leverage was already firmly in its favour. As they are in many Southeast Asian countries, the fear of Chinese dominance and a desire to build links with the West are powerful forces pushing Myanmar into India’s arms.
India clearly has its eyes set desperately on Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves, and given its energy needs, is willing to bend over backwards to secure them. But China is still getting the best of the trade and energy deals, while India has paid a serious price in ruining the ethical basis of its foreign policy, while doing little to advance the cause of democratic reform in Myanmar.
Eric Randolph