THE MAGAZINE: September 2010

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Monday
Aug302010

Cash Transfers In The Developing World

The rush to cut government spending and further squeeze the poor in Europe and the United States shows a widening attitude gap with the Global South. For more than a decade, since the Asian financial crisis presaged the northern crash of 2008, southern governments have been moving in the opposite direction. In particular, in the late 1990s Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia introduced cash transfer programmes in the form of child benefit schemes, non-contributory pensions and family grants, not just to cushion the lives of poor people, but explicitly to stimulate development and long-term poverty reduction. In the decade since then, more than 40 countries have introduced such programmes, and more than 100 million families are now receiving grants.

Their rapid expansion since then reflects the success of the programmes. Contrary to the ingrained prejudices of many in the developed world, poor people use extra money wisely. Half goes on more and better food, which improves health and nutrition, and is particularly important for the development of young children. Indeed, a large chunk of grants is spent on children – clothing, shoes, school books – and on replacing the pennies children would earn if they worked. One of the most important impacts of cash transfers is therefore increased school attendance. 

Finally, part of the grant is invested – in fertiliser or better seeds, in more goods to sell, or in going further afield to search for work. Far from making people lazy, grants stimulate initiative. You cannot pull yourself up by your boot straps if you have no boots, and cash transfers often provide the boots. As well as this direct investment in income-earning activities, much of the grant is spent locally – in most countries on locally produced food – which further stimulates the economy and promotes a positive growth spiral. 

Thus cash transfers are proving to be a double success, reducing immediate hunger and malnutrition, while also stimulating local economic growth. 

The North-South attitude gap is partly linked to beliefs as to who is to blame for poverty. Opinion poll surveys show that 61% of people in the United State think that poverty in the US is caused by laziness and lack of will by the poor themselves. By contrast, the same polls show that in Mexico and Brazil more than 75% of people think that poverty in their own country is caused by an unfair society. So the starting point is that the rich North says that it deserves to be rich and the poor are to blame for their poverty, while the poor South says that poverty is basically about a lack of money – which can be rectified by giving money to the poor.

Cash transfers have a long history in Europe. Pensions began in the late 19th century and family grants were introduced in the first half of the 20th century. Such benefits were less common in the United States and with the leading international financial institutions based in Washington, they tended to reflect an attitude that blamed the poor for their predicament and felt that aid and benefits should be tightly controlled. They also  argued that poor countries could not afford cash transfers – that economic growth had to come first. But the global South began to realise that in Europe, cash transfers had come first and had created the conditions for industrialisation and economic growth. So grants began to be introduced in the late 1990s, initially by newly industrialising countries that could afford to fund them from tax revenues and did not need permission from the International Monetary Fund.

Southern governments were impressed by the results, and programmes grew and expanded. The rich North (and, sometimes, the rich in southern countries) demanded that studies be carried out on the effectiveness and sustainability of these programmes, and as the studies mounted up, the results were confirmed: cash transfers reduce poverty, stimulate growth, and don’t make people lazy.

These studies form the basis for a new book I co-authored with Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme, called “Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South”. Not all cash transfers work. The book notes that every cash transfer programme is different, and that the successful ones are locally developed and reflect local politics and history. Foreign models cannot be simply imported. And there are five principles for success.

  • Fair. Grants must be seen to be fair in the sense that most citizens must agree on who receives money. That usually means a broadly based scheme, covering one quarter or more of families. Systems which have tried to target the very poorest often fail because people who do not receive a grant will say they are as poor as a neighbour who does receive a grant. A child benefit going to all children is often seen as fairer than targeting the poorest.
  • Assured. Grants must be long term and rights-based. They cannot be temporary or short-term charity. People must be convinced the money will arrive every month so they can plan on it.
  • Practical. The civil service must be able to carry out the system. Conditions such as school attendance can only be imposed if there are enough school places.
  • Not just pennies. Grants must be large enough to cause a real change in behaviour, such as allowing children to attend school instead of working. A grant must be more than 20% of a poor household’s consumption.
  • Popular. Any grant must be politically popular and a vote winner, to ensure that it is continued after a change in government. That reinforces the need for cash transfers to be locally developed, usually with wide debate and consultation.

The range of cash transfers has proved to be very broad. South Africa has one of the biggest programmes in the Global South, spending $9 billion (3.5% of GDP) per year. A non-contributory pension reaches 85% of people 63 and older while a child benefit reaches 55% of children under 15 years old. These grants are unconditional. Research in South Africa shows that the type of grant does not make much difference, because both pensions and child grants are shared across the entire family. Brazil has a family grant plus social and rural pensions that benefit 39% of the population, about 74 million people. The cost is about 1.5% of GDP. 

Mexico also has a family grant, linked to requirement that children attend school; it reaches 22% of the population and costs only 0.3% of GDP. There is a debate about conditions, which the wealthy often wish to impose on cash transfers to ensure they are politically popular with those who do not trust the poor to spend the money wisely. But comparing Mexico to South Africa, which has no conditions, shows that they make little difference – poor people really do want to send their children to school and will do so if their children do not need to work. Interestingly, for secondary school age children, Mexico gives part of the grant to the children themselves if they attend school, and this does seem to improve school attendance.

Mongolia provides an example of how transfers evolve to reach large swathes of the population. Cash transfers started there with a form of benefit targeted at the poorest children, but the government found it difficult to accurately select the poorest, so expanded the benefit to all children. 

Cash transfers can be started with less than 1% of GDP, which is less than fuel and other subsidies in many countries, and can therefore be started simply from tax revenues. Some countries, including Mongolia, Ghana, and Bolivia (and the US state of Alaska) pay for cash transfers from oil and other mineral revenues, although the very poorest African countries may need aid money to support pensions or child benefits. 

All of this amounts to a new agenda being set by the Global South – one which simply amounts to giving money to the poor. The lesson from those who have taken on this idea is that it works. 

--

Joseph Hanlon is Senior Lecturer in Development Policy and Practice at the Open University, London, and co-author of Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution From the Global South (Kumarian Press, 2010). [LINK]

Tuesday
Aug242010

Taliban Tribunals A Viable Alternative To Afghanistan's Legal System?

In northern Afghanistan, some say judiciary is so corrupt they prefer to ask Taleban courts to adjudicate in disputes. 

By Qayum Babak

--

Residents of northern provinces of Afghanistan say they are turning to ad hoc Taleban tribunals as an alternative to the official state-run courts, which they say are corrupt and ineffectual.

They say the Taleban do not ask for bribes, and act far more quickly than the judicial system.

The fact that the militants have the capacity to mete out a kind of parallel justice, and that residents are placing their faith in it, is especially alarming given that northern Afghanistan has in recent years been more secure than the south, where the Taleban have a stronger military presence and more of a cultural affinity with the Pashtuns who live there.

Shir Mohammad, 50, from the Chemtal district of Balkh province, told IWPR how he asked the Taleban to arbitrate after a local court asked for a large bribe just to review his case.

The dispute arose when his son sold a motorcycle to a man named Nuriddin, who later refused to pay for it. Shir Mohammad abandoned attempts to pursue the debt through a conventional court after being asked to pay bribes which would have amounted to half the sum owed.

“One day the Taleban came to our mosque and I complained to them,” he said. “That night, the Taleban summoned Nuriddin and looked into the case. Nuriddin admitted that he ought to pay me the money, and he did.”

Shir Mohammad said he was happy with the way the Taleban handled the matter, as they settled the dispute decisively on the basis of Islamic law, and asked for no money in return.

The head of the appeals court for Balkh province, Denar Khil, flatly denied that the courts were corrupt, saying such claims were just propaganda.

“There is no corruption or bribe-taking to make people in Balkh turn to the Taleban,” he said.

He said any rulings made by the insurgents were illegal as they did not follow the various stages of due process.

“By law, a case has to go through three courts,” he said. “If a judge makes a [final] decision before that happens, it will not be fair or just.”

Allegations that corruption is endemic in the institutions of government and state have long been made both by Afghans and the international community.

A recent survey by the watchdog group Integrity Watch Afghanistan suggested that the sum of bribes paid last year came to around one billion US dollars. Half the respondents to the survey believed the Taleban were strong because they were not corrupt.

Experts believe this perception encourages people to cooperate with the insurgents.

Nabi Aseer, a lawyer and political analyst in Balkh province, said corruption and crime reached the highest levels of government.

“The state has a fundamental problem,” he said. “The country’s ruling figures are clearly corrupt and their foreign supporters have also played a role in fostering corruption. The people are exhausted by the corruption within government, and they’re turning to the Taleban.”

Mohaiuddin, the head of the village of Chelgazi in Qaisar district, part of Faryab province to the west of Balkh, described how the Taleban had returned to the area and established parallel structures of government and justice.

This administrative system was essentially the same as when the Taleban governed the country from 1996 to 2001, with provincial and district governors and judges for each province. The only difference now, Mohaiuddin said, was that these shadow structures had no fixed location, but moved around, using mosques as bases from which to deliver their rulings.

He said residents of the area now preferred Taleban justice to that of the state.

“The Taleban solve cases that are of great importance to people, without taking bribes or creating other problems,” Mohaiuddin said. “They even settle disputes over murder within three days, and establish the rights of the [various] parties in an appropriate manner. That is why people go to them.”

A Taleban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahed, told IWPR in a telephone interview that the movement still maintained an administrative network across Afghanistan as it did when it was in power.

“Thank God, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has its own organisational system covering the entire territory of the country. The Islamic Emirate’s officials serve the Muslim people of the country and respond to their petitions as far as they are able after waging jihad against the infidel aggressors,” Mujahid said. “Afghans are Muslims who have never lived under outsiders and won’t do so. We are pleased to see that day by day, the true nature of the Afghan government and its foreign friends is being revealed, and that people are turning to the Taleban.”

President Hamid Karzai’s spokesman Wahid Omar, speaking at a press conference, denied that the Taleban exercised significant influence among the public.

“The Taleban appear in some regions furtively and for brief periods, and after a short time, they are either hunted down or else they run away,” he said.

He admitted that corruption existed within government, but insisted every effort was being made to tackle it.

Qasim Ludin of the government’s Supervisory Office, a body designed to fight corruption, acknowledged that problems existed but said they were already being addressed.

“It is true that corruption exists in Afghanistan and that we’ve been unable to stop it entirely so far,” he said. “But I can confidently say that corruption will be soon be eradicated within government, as we have already adopted new strategies.”

It remains to be seen whether such policies will translate into greater public confidence in state institutions including the judiciary.

Haji Sadeq, 55, a resident of Mazar-e Sharif, the main town in Bakh, said he had little trust in the state courts he was dealing with.

“This is the third year I’ve been pursuing a lawsuit about my land at the Balkh provincial court,” he said. “There’s been no progress in the case. It’s easy to see that the administration is taking bribes and creating trouble for people – nothing else.”

--

Qayum Babak is an IWPR-trained reporter in Balkh province. This article originally appeared in Afghan Reconstruction Report (ARR) Issue 369 (17 August 2010), produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net.

Tuesday
Aug242010

Alleged NATO Bombing Deaths in July Could Boost Afghanistan's Insurgency

Reported air attack that killed 52 people may prove powerful recruiting tool for insurgents, despite NATO denials of responsibility.

By Mohammad Ilyas Dayee

--

Mohammmad Khan clutches his head and screams at the sky as he recalls the events in which 13 members of his family lost their lives.

The 40-year-old said that the sun had been setting over the village of Rigi in the Helmand province of southern Afghanistan on July 23 when he saw planes flying overhead.

He called out to his mother to save herself and his children, fearing they would be caught by a deadly air attack.

But it was too late – their compound was destroyed and he and his sister were the only family members to survive.

“I didn’t know where my mother had taken refuge,” Mohammad Khan said. “I had no idea where she was; she was caught up in the fire.”

“How was she at fault?” he asked, as other residents of the village in Sangin district wept around him.

Locals claim that 52 people were killed that day, a figure backed up by President Hamid Karzai, who said that an Afghan investigation had revealed the deaths were caused by an air-to-ground missile fired by a NATO plane.

This allegation was denied by the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, the International Assistance Security Force or ISAF, which said that missiles were used in an armed engagement, but this happened ten kilometers away from Rigi. Six insurgents died in the clash, in which missiles were fired in response to Taleban gunfire, and none of the weapons strayed, an ISAF statement said.

While what happened in Rigi remain disputed, what is beyond doubt is many people believe it could prove a powerful recruiting tool for the Taleban.

“First of all, I will leave it to [President Hamid] Karzai to bring the culprits to justice, but if he doesn’t do anything about it, I myself will wreak revenge on these infidels,” said Mohammad Khan. “I was already aware of the intentions of these infidels and we have had experience of them – any time the Taleban put pressure on them, they bombard civilians.”

Other residents of Rigi, too, say they are ready to take up arms against the Afghan government and the international forces.

“My wife and five children are lying in their graves. I have no more to lose – now I will join the Taleban,” said Rahmatullah Khan, his body twisting in pain as he clenched a corner of his turban between his teeth. “If they are spotting people with binoculars, then they should have shot me, because I dress like the Taleban. But what about my wife – she wasn’t dressed like the Taleban. Why was she killed?”

People in the villagers, many of whom had already been displaced from homes located between Sangin district and Sarwan Kala to escape clashes between ISAF troops and the Taleban, described scenes of panic and confusion as people searched for loved ones.

Khangul Kaka, an elderly man holding a child in his lap, wept as he described the boy’s close escape from death.

“His parents are under the debris,” he said. “We dragged him out of the fire, and now he is crying for his mother. We don’t know who we should hand him over to.”

Haji Rahim, whose house was destroyed, leaving him the sole survivor, said, “My wife was pregnant and three of my children are dead under the ruin and rubble. I wish I had been killed as well.”

BBC journalist Aziz Ahmad Shafe, who visited Rigi, says the victims came from five families, with 17 of the dead belonging to one household.

The head of the health department in neighbouring Kandahar province, Dr Abdul Qayum, said seven injured children had been brought to the Mirwais Hospital from Sangin district.

The issue of civilian casualties incurred in anti-insurgency operations has long been a source of friction between the Afghan government and the international forces, as well as of huge resentment from the local population.

Journalist and defence expert Abdul Tawab Qureshi said the incident in Rigi, combined with a change in the command of the international forces, had raised many questions in the public’s mind.

At the end of June, General David Petraeus took over as commander of US forces in the country following the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal. Petraeus has softened some of the restrictions on the rules of engagement – including those for calling in air strikes – which had been imposed by McChrystal in an attempt to reduce civilian casualties.

Qureshi said that Petraeus clearly favoured the use of aerial bombardments which had been banned by his predecessor, adding that the incident in Rigi proved that McChrystal’s judgement had been right.

Such civilian deaths will shift public opinion and reduce the level of trust among local people, thus dealing a blow to the US forces deployed in Helmand, he argued.

“People have confidence in the American troops, compared with other troops in Helmand, because they are spending money and also bringing security,” Qureshi said. “But such incidents in which civilians are killed will have a profound effect on their views and reduce them [US troops] to the same level as the British.”

Ramazan, a doctor from Lashkar Gah, the administrative centre of Helmand province, said that such incidents were likely to “inflame the talk of jihad [holy war] so famously employed by the Taleban. This is now giving them the perfect opportunity to recruit among these people.”

“I don’t think the government is going to be able to satisfy those who’ve lost everything in this incident,” he continued. “They are unhappy that the government is ignoring them, and they will now take up arms.”

Shamsullah Sahrai, a candidate from Sangin running in the September parliamentary election, said he had been planning to campaign in the district but had now been warned not to travel there.

“This incident has made the people of Helmand angry with the government and the international forces, and they will remain angry until those responsible for this incident are brought to justice and punished,” he said. “We are fed up of this kind of friendship and assistance.”

Mohammad Rafi, a Sangin resident and a former army officer, predicted that the Rigi incident and other similar cases would have a huge impact on the Americans and their allies.

Civilian casualties are one of the major factors that will strengthen the Taleban, he argued.

“In the current situation, one civilian death paves the way for the killing of five American soldiers,” he said.

--

Mohammad Ilyas Dayee is an IWPR reporter in Helmand. This article originally appeared in Afghan Reconstruction Report (ARR) Issue 369 (19 August 2010), produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net.

Tuesday
Aug242010

Uproar Over Voting Cards in Afghanistan's Herat Province

Many eligible voters reportedly angry that they have not been able to register for the September ballot

By Shahpoor Saber

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Thousands of Herat province residents eligible to vote in next month’s parliamentary elections have been denied voting cards, putting the validity of the ballot in doubt, according to some candidates and locals in several provincial districts.

Voting card distribution for the September 18 poll began on June 11 and ended on August 12, but candidates claim the authorities were wrong to set up just two voting card distribution centres to cover such a large province.

Khan Gul Mohammadi, a local candidate for the lower house of parliament, says he now regrets putting himself forward for the election because, he claims, it will not be transparent.

He alleges that 6,000 eligible locals from his district of Farsi couldn’t get a voting card because of the absence of a local distribution centre.

“The Independent Election Commission has taken away the rights of so many people – casting doubt over the work of the commission and showing the elections to be fraudulent,” he said.

Dr Mohammad Naseem Saha, another candidate for the lower house, is also critical of the work of the commission, claiming that only ten per cent of his 40 supporters managed to get voting cards.

He insists that 400 eligible voters from the Zenda Jan district had come to him to complain that they too had not been able to register.

Haji Abdullah, 75, a resident of Zenda Jan, said he had gone to great lengths to get a voting card, but to no avail, “It took me two days to travel from my district to a [distribution centre] to get a card. Then I had to wait long hours in long queues under the hot sun, but I didn’t manage to get one and eventually gave up.”

Shafiullah, 20, who has just returned to Afghanistan from Iran, said the first thing he did when he got back was to try to register for the ballot because he was so keen to vote for his favourite candidate.

“I tried to get a voting card for three days and each day I failed and finally I had to get back home without a card. The elections have lost their meaning for me as I can’t vote for anyone,” he said.

He said the voting card distribution process should be extended and more centres set up across the province, pointing out that there are so many Afghans returning from Iran and there was still plenty of time to register for the election.

But the Independent Election Commission, IEC, denies that eligible voters are being denied the opportunity to cast a ballot.

Awalruhaman Roadwal, head of Independent Election Commission in Herat, says that over the past two months 34,000 voting cards have been distributed to locals, including refugees, and even people who’ve lost their cards have had them replaced.

“I can candidly say that everyone who is entitled to it has received a voting card and those who say otherwise are in fact reluctant to take part in the election,” he said.

“Three months is not a limited time for the distribution process and all those who wanted to participate in the ballot could have gotten their cards if they really wanted.

“Opening voting cards distribution centres in all the districts of Herat province would be extremely difficult if not impossible.”

He said that if this had been done in Herat, it would have had to have been done in districts across the whole country, which would have been hard to achieve.

Fazel Ahmad Manawi, head of the IEC in Kabul, told Radio Liberty that the commission had distributed a total of 17,5 million voting cards nationally.

“In fact, we were not planning any voting card distribution for these elections as enough cards were distributed last year. We resumed this process just to make sure that no-ne was deprived of their rights to vote,” he said.

Obaid Elahi, a journalist and a political analyst in Herat province, believes the IEC has distributed sufficient numbers of cards, and warned that extending the process and giving more out could lead to fraud.

He also cast doubt over the integrity of some of the local candidates who he suspects might encourage their supporters to get more than one voting card.

Indeed, some of the candidates are already concerned that a number of their richer rivals might try to bribe locals to vote for them. Nazeer Ahmad Reha claims there have been cases of them hiring buses and other means of transport to ferry people to the voting card distribution centres.

Reha claims that the wealthier candidates are big threat to the validity of the ballot because they are not popular but use their money to get people to vote.

--

Shahpoor Saber is an IWPR trained journalist in Herat. This article originally appeared in Afghan Reconstruction Report (ARR) Issue 369 (20 August 2010), produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net.

Friday
Aug202010

Former Afghan Militants Rejoin Insurgency

Fighters in Herat defect after government fails to fulfill promises of work and development.

By Zia Ahmadi

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Militants in Herat province of eastern Afghanistan who laid down their weapons in response to government offers of aid and amnesty are rejoining the insurgency after officials failed to deliver on their promises.

A senior security official told IWPR that about half the 1,000 militants who had surrendered in the last year were now back fighting against the government.

Both the Afghan government and the international community have made it a priority to persuade members of the Taleban and allied armed groups to defect, and this was the focus of a “peace jirga”or assembly hosted by President Hamid Karzai in the capital Kabul in June.

Efforts have focused on winning over small groups in return for protection from legal investigations, the provision of jobs and reconstruction projects for their home areas.

However, in a telephone interview with IWPR, Nur Gul, a Taleban commander who surrendered with his 20 armed men last October, said none of the promises he received beforehand had been translated into action.

Nur Gul, 38, was originally part of the Jamiat-e Islami faction, which fought against the Taleban in northern Afghanistan in the Nineties. But then he switched allegiances and joined his former Taleban enemies, before being persuaded to come over to the government side.

“The day we surrendered, the Italian PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] gave each of us one sack of rice, a can of cooking oil and a winter jacket,” he said. “They showed this on TV, which we found very humiliating, as most people might think we’d been fighting only for some rice or cooking oil.”

Nur Gul said his men were being harassed by Afghan security officers, had not been given jobs and had seen no reconstruction work.

“We thought we had an independent government, but [now] we realise it’s the foreigners who have the bigger say in this country, not the Afghan government,” he said.

Now he is back with the Taleban.

“This time I will fight against the government and the foreign occupying forces to the last drop of blood,” he said.

Arbab Zaman Gul, 40, from the Keshk Kuhna district, was a commander in Hezb-e Islami, an insurgent group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and allied with the Taleban, surrendered to Herat provincial police together with his 30 fighters this May.

But he too has returned to violence, accusing the government of reneging on its promises.

“After we surrendered and received a letter of protection from the government, four of my men were killed within the next ten days,” he said. He accuses “government elements” of the killings.

“The reason we surrendered was not in order to be harassed or tortured by government security forces, but to help restore peace and security,” Zaman Gul said. “We wanted our area to be rebuilt and we wanted job opportunities to be created so that we would have a chance to get work. But the government has reneged on all its commitments.

“So we have had to go out, pick up our weapons and fight them again. If the government continues with its lies, not only will no one want to surrender, but the number of people opposing it will increase.

Mullah Mustafa, a former Taleban commander who surrendered and joined the peace process along with his 50 fighters, told IWPR that he had not yet returned to the armed struggle. But he warned that if the government failed to deliver on promises, his men would take up arms again.

Officials acknowledge that there have been problems with the reconciliation process, pointing to a lack of resources and the conflicting priorities of different government agencies.

The effort to persuade militants to turn away from violence has been led by the National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, NPRC, founded in 2005. Sharif Mojaddidi, who heads the NPRC’s division for western Afghanistan, says between 5,000 to 7,000 insurgents across the country have joined the peace process in the last five years.

He said the government provides militants who surrender with letters of protection, and promises them it will create jobs and launch reconstruction efforts in the areas they come from.

Mojaddidi acknowledged that some insurgents had gone back to the other side due to budgetary constraints which prevented some pledges being delivered on, and also to what he described as “inattentiveness” on the part of some senior government officials.

Herat provincial police chief Mohammad Salim Ehsas said the militants who join the peace process had unrealistic expectations – they wanted reconstruction, job creation and the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan, all in the very near future.

Siawash, a political analyst in Herat province, said he believed that most of those who join the peace process were simply armed criminals, rather than part of the opposition. Once they realised they were no longer able to make a living out of crime, he said, they came to the government and claimed to be militants willing to surrender. Then they would turn back to crime again.

According to Siawash, the real opposition has an ideological agenda which makes it harder to persuade members to surrender just to get money or jobs.

A high-ranking official for the western security zone, speaking on condition of anonymity, estimated that out of the more than 1,000 armed men who had handed in their weapons over the last year, “500 are back fighting the government and the international forces”.

He said those who had resumed militant activity mainly came from the Bala Murghab and Qades districts of Badghis province, and the Keshk Kuhna, Guzra, Adreskan and Shindand districts of Herat province.

The official was among those who have accused officers of the National Directorate of Security, NDS, of harassing former militants and alienating them from the reconciliation process.

Even though men who surrendered were generally issued with a letter of protection, the NDS frequently interrogated them.

General Ekramuddin Yawar, chief of police for the western security zone, agreed that intelligence service had put pressure on former militants in an attempt to extract information from them. On some occasions, he said, this had driven the gunmen to defect again.

“Some of those who had joined the peace process have gone back… and resumed their activities against Afghan and international security forces,” he said.

An NDS official in Herat province, who declined to be named, said that the agency had to interrogate those who surrendered in order to identify their associates. He insisted those interrogated were not tortured or imprisoned.

Sharif Ahmad, a former militant, said in a telephone interview that NDS questioning had prompted him to go back to the insurgents.

“Although I surrendered all the arms I had to the government, I was still put under pressure by NDS officers, who wanted me to hand in more weapons,” he said.

He said that when he found out that the NDS was going to detain him again, he rejoined the insurgents.

--

Zia Ahmadi is an IWPR trained journalist in Herat. This article originally appeared in Afghan Reconstruction Report (ARR) Issue 368 (8 August 2010), produced by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, www.iwpr.net.