The Limits of Netwar

John Arquilla’s new article in Foreign Policy warns of the coming “netwars”, in which networked forces will overwhelm traditionally-structured, rigid militaries. In the article, Arquilla posits three new rules of war defining the future of armed conflict. First, many small units will trump few large ones. He predicts that traditional militaries, organized to fight other large centralized opponents, are unable to effectively counter small, decentralized adversaries. Second, finding the enemy will be critical to victory - a task, he claims, that is best accomplished by small teams rather than large military units. Third, future wars will be dominated by swarming: small, fast forces attacking from multiple directions. These swarms will overwhelm defenders and create widespread "system disruption". Arquilla argues that if the United States military is to survive these future netwars, it must itself reorganize into a network of small and flexible units. In his words, “it will take a swarm to defeat a swarm.”

Arquilla is correct: a netwar-enabled military would be powerful. Swarms of small American units could be perfectly suited for dismantling irregular terrorist networks in Afghanistan and elsewhere. However, America will never have a netwar military. Why? One reason: the political cost of casualties.

While a network of small swarming units represents substantial capacity, it also increases the risks to individual units on the battlefield. Operating quasi-independently and at speed, netwar’s small units are vulnerable to being flanked, isolated, and overrun. The network is resilient, but individual nodes are exposed. In fact, the unit size Arquilla mentions - "50 or so soldiers … connected to others, especially friendly indigenous forces, and [networked] closely with even a handful of attack aircraft" -  is the same composition as an American unit that nearly suffered the worst defeat in the Afghanistan campaign.

In 2008, the remote Wanat Combat Outpost, occupied by 45 American and 25 Afghan soldiers, was almost overrun by around 200 Taliban. During the attack, Taliban fighters breached the small outpost’s defenses and were only repulsed after a desperate close quarters battle. The attack left nine U.S. soldiers dead and the outpost was quickly abandoned. If the Taliban’s attack had been successful, the loss of this one node would have had little detrimental effect on an Arquillan network of small units. However, the loss of 45 American soldiers in a single day would be a mortal wound to public support back home.

In democracies, casualties determine public support for conflict and for the political leadership responsible for involvement in it. A reality of contemporary warfare is that casualties are such powerful political forces that policymakers are understandably risk-averse when it comes to the lives of men and women in uniform; each casualty becomes a chink in the armor, undermining the reelection prospects of public office holders who support putting troops in harm's way. One only needs to look at the vigor with which elected officials took up the call for up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs to see how the political power of real and potential future casualties plays out in real life.

The Powell Doctrine is worth remembering here; developed more than twenty years ago, it was more than a strategy for victory, it was a plea to employ such overwhelming force that friendly casualties were minimized and political support for the operation was maintained. The netwar approach overlooks these salient political considerations. The vulnerability of individual units in Arquilla’s netwar military leaves the entire operation at risk of losing public and political support. Even the loss of one or two units would be enough to turn public opinion against most conflicts (short of total war). Many of Arquilla’s own examples of swarmers: Vietnamese guerillas; al Qaeda groups in Bali, Madrid, and London; and Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Mumbai raiders suffered astronomical losses. These swarming strategies were militarily effective, but they come with immense human costs that are unacceptable in a democratic society.

Fighting the next generation of American wars with small bands of mobile soldiers swarming the battlefield would be an effective strategy. However, the danger to those units is too risky for political leaders. There is power in small, networked units, but there is security in massed forces and large fortress bases, both for servicemen and politicians.