NATO & Afghanistan: The Costs of Doing Business

Serendipity... within days of our publication of Jon Western's piece on Obama's NATO Challenge, both Patrick Porter of King's College London and the New Yorker's Steve Coll have posted their respective thoughts on the costs of intervention in Afghanistan.

For Porter ("No Clout For Blood?"), the question is influence and the Anglo-American "special relationship", particularly as it relates to Britain's maturity as an insurgency-fighting authority. "[I]n exchange for blood and participation," he writes, "the Brits get little special influence with America. Benefits, sure, but not a singular or pivotal status in Washington." A key point Porter raises is that "the rhetoric of the special relationship is quite bad for British interests. It means that Britain’s considerable efforts are judged harshly, and when the reward of special influence is not forthcoming, leads to disappointment."

For Coll ("Burden Sharing"), the numbers are telling - per capita casualties among ISAF troop contributing nations put the lie to complaints among some in the US that its NATO allies aren't doing their share. Set that against the relative national interests of NATO players in Afghanistan. "Estonia," Coll argues, "has borne its burdens in a war whose causes do not lie very close to home. And of all the countries on the list, it is probably Denmark and Canada that have borne the greatest political shocks overall. It is a wonder they have stayed as committed as they have for as long as they have."

For more on Porter's argument, see the forthcoming issue of International Affairs, where he's got a fuller research article on the subject. And go read Coll's piece; the statistics (which I'm not normally fond of) put things in context.